By Amy McCallen
In Stears v.
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., SJC-12544 (2019), the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court was called on to answer a certified
question from the District of Massachusetts concerning
whether the six-year
statute of repose set forth in G.L.
c. 260, § 2B bars tort
claims arising from diseases, such as those arising from asbestos exposure,
whose effects are unlikely to ever appear within this timeframe. In a decision
which the SJC acknowledged “will have the regrettable effect” of barring these
types of claims at least with respect to those protected by the statute of
repose, the SJC answered that question in the affirmative.
In a decision which the SJC
acknowledged “will have the regrettable effect” of barring these types of
claims at least with respect to those protected by the statute of repose, the
SJC answered that question in the affirmative.
The statute of repose applies to a
limited category of protected actors performing particularized construction
services, such as contractors, architects, engineers, and any others involved
in the design, construction, or general administration of an improvement to
real property. Therefore, while this ruling will not bar claims against
manufacturers or suppliers of fungible goods, with respect to contractors and
other design professionals who may be sued directly by an asbestos plaintiff or
brought into an asbestos-related lawsuit by a third-party complaint for
contribution, the Stearns decision provides a roadmap for possible early and
complete favorable resolution.
The underlying lawsuit was filed in
2015 and asserted claims arising from the decedent’s exposure to asbestos in connection
with the construction of two nuclear power plants in the 1970s. Defendant
General Electric, designed, manufactured, and sold steam turbine generators for
installation at each of the plants as well as supervised the installations.
GE’s installation specifications called for the use of asbestos-containing
insulation materials. Given its role on the project, GE moved for summary
judgment on the grounds that plaintiff’s claims were barred by the six-year
statute of repose.
Notably GE’s arguments did not
carry the day at summary judgment. The federal court pointed out that the
fundamental realities of asbestos-related diseases is that the effects will
rarely, if ever, appear within this window. Further the dangers of asbestos
exposure were well-known in the 1970s making GE’s expectation that the slate
would be wiped clean after six years unreasonable.
The issue was submitted to the SJC
via certified question after GE moved for reconsideration. The SJC found that
the statute was “unequivocal”. The SJC reasoned that the apparent intent of the
Legislature was to place an absolute time limit on the liability of those
protected by the statute. Therefore, while acknowledging that the decision had
the effect of causing great hardship to certain plaintiffs, the SJC found that
this hardship was for the Legislature, and not the courts, to resolve.
Originally posted September 28,
2018 on tlawmtm.com.
The Stears v. Metropolitan Life
Insurance Co., SJC-12544 (2019) decision may be found here
at this link.
An
associate in the firm of Moriarty Troyer & Malloy LLC and a member of
REBA’s Litigation section, Amy has over
fifteen years of experience as a practicing attorney in Massachusetts. She
represents corporations, partnerships and individuals in real estate,
employment and commercial litigation matters in state and federal courts and
before administrative agencies. She can be contacted by email at amccallen@lawmtm.com.
