Tuesday, February 17, 2026
The Supreme Court’s Seven County Case: New Legal Principles Govern the National Environmental Policy Act
Last May, the U.S. Supreme Court significantly
affected how agencies comply with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),
and how courts review compliance, in its decision Seven County
Infrastructure Coalition v. Eagle County et al, (2025).
The 5-3 majority (Gorsuch did not participate in the decision) held that courts must give
Factual Background: The Seven County Infrastructure Coalition filed a petition to construct
and operate an 80-mile railway in the Utah’s Unita Basin, to transport waxy
crude oil from the Basin. The Surface Transportation Board (STB), the federal
agency responsible for approving railroad projects in Colorado, prepared an Environmental
Impact Statement (EIS) for the project but declined to include impacts beyond
the project site in its report.
Namely, the Environmental Impact
Statement did not consider the effects of increased crude oil refining, of
potential oil spills, or effects on historic sites or existing infrastructure
along the railway and Colorado River. The Surface Transportation Board
authorized the project. A coalition of environmental groups and Eagle County,
Colorado challenged this decision for failing to meet NEPA requirements by not
including the project’s reasonably foreseeable environmental impacts.
The D.C. Circuit agreed with the
petitioners. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Holding:
NEPA does not impose substantive limits on agencies’ decisions, requiring that
agencies be given “substantial deference” in determining the scope and detail
of their environmental impact statements. Environmental impact statements are
extremely fact and context-dependent, and as such it is not the role of the
court “to micromanage those agency choices so long as they fall within a broad
zone of reasonableness.”
While
it is possible for impacts which occur outside the project’s geographic area or
construction timeframe to be required in an environmental impact statement, it
is not required in this case because the upstream and downstream effects are
geographically removed, are not proximately caused by the project, and fall
outside the Surface Transportation Board’s regulatory authority.
These
factors lack the “reasonably close causal relationship” necessary to be
required in an environmental impact statement. The opinion further stated that
including these upstream and downstream effects would hinder infrastructure
development and the associated construction. The lower court was reversed and
the Surface Transportation Board’s decision was upheld.
Concurrence:
The Surface Transportation Board lacks the authority to regulate downstream and
upstream activities, and need not analyze these impacts it is unable to prevent
under its organic statute.
Impact: Seven
County is expected to expedite NEPA approval for all federal projects. NEPA
has long been controversial for what some perceive to be an overstretching of
its procedural mandate as a substantive roadblock, with many welcoming this
decision as removing unnecessary bureaucratic hurdles which hinder necessary
development.
Amidst
an administration that is unfriendly to renewable energy projects (e.g. Executive
order 14154, which pauses disbursement of federal funds already earmarked for
the “green new deal” energy projects) and a boom in fossil fuel demand brought
on by increased energy usage from A.I., there is concern that Seven County
will do more to foster fossil fuel-related projects than their renewable
counterparts.
Here are salient excerpts
from the Court’s opinion which emphasize the new principles at play:
The
D. C. Circuit failed to afford the Board the substantial judicial deference
required in NEPA cases and incorrectly interpreted NEPA to require the Board to
consider the environmental effects of upstream and downstream projects that are
separate in time or place from the Uinta Basin Railway.... As a purely
procedural statute, NEPA “does not mandate particular results, but simply
prescribes the necessary process” for an agency’s environmental review of a
project…Some federal courts reviewing NEPA cases have assumed an aggressive
role in policing agency compliance with NEPA and have not applied NEPA with the
judicial deference demanded by the statutory text and the Court’s cases. When,
as here, a party argues that an agency action was arbitrary
and capricious due to a deficiency in an EIS, the “only role for a court” is to
confirm that the agency has addressed environmental consequences and feasible
alternatives as to the relevant project….Further, the adequacy of an EIS is
relevant only to the question of whether an agency’s final decision (here, to
approve the railroad project) was reasonably explained.
Courts
should defer to agencies’ discretionary decisions about where to draw the line
when considering indirect environmental effects and whether to analyze effects
from other pro jects separate in time or place…. In sum, when assessing
significant environmental effects and feasible alternatives for purposes of
NEPA, an agency will invariably make a series of fact-dependent, context
specific, and policy-laden choices about the depth and breadth of its
inquiry—and also about the length, content, and level of detail of the
resulting EIS. Courts should afford substantial deference and should not
micromanage those agency choices so long as they fall within a broad zone of
reasonableness. Even a deficient EIS does not necessarily require vacating an
agency’s project approval, absent reason to …believe that the agency might
disapprove the project if it added more to the EIS….
Contrary
to the D. C. Circuit’s NEPA analysis, the Board’s determination that its EIS
need not evaluate possible environmental effects from upstream and downstream
projects separate from the Uinta Basin Railway complied with NEPA’s procedural
requirements, particularly NEPA’s textually mandated focus on the “proposed
action” under agency review. While indirect environmental effects of the
project itself may fall within NEPA’s scope even if they might extend outside
the geographical territory of the project or materialize later in time, the
fact that the project might foreseeably lead to the construction or increased
use of a separate project does not mean the agency must consider that separate
project’s environmental effects…. This is particularly true where, as here,
those separate projects fall outside the agency’s regulatory authority….NEPA
does not allow courts, “under the guise of judicial review” of agency
compliance with NEPA, to delay or block agency projects based on the
environmental effects of other projects separate from the project at hand.
This
Supreme Court decision narrows the scope of environmental review under NEPA,
with much of NEPA’s power left to expected agency-specific interpretation
guidelines. Agencies also are empowered by a highly deferential standard of
review for environmental impact statements that may not require consideration
of factors that are “separate in time or space” from the proposed project, or
as one justice called it, upstream and downstream impacts.
It
is yet to be seen exactly when and how courts will require that these facts and
factors be included in an environmental impact statement. It is notable that
this language substantially deviates from the previous standard that
“reasonably foreseeable impacts” should be included in an environmental impact
statement, not to mention the Supreme Court’s decisions abrogating the Chevron
Doctrine about court deference to agencies.
A longtime Co-chair of
REBA’s Environmental Law Section, Greg McGregor practices with McGregor Law
Group PC. He can be contacted at gimcg@mcgregorlaw.com.

