Wednesday, April 29, 2026

Understanding Condominium Lien Priority: Why Waiting to Act Can Cost Your Condominium

 For most condominiums, monthly payments are the sole source of income and critical to maintaining solvency. Rising costs and economic uncertainty


may lead to increasing numbers of owners failing to submit payment timely. Quickly recovering dues from delinquent owners is essential to preventing the condominium itself from becoming financially distressed.

Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 183A, § 6 grants organizations of unit owners priority status for a portion of unpaid dues. This is a powerful collection tool that allows an organization of unit owners to recover debt ahead of other creditors, including first mortgagees. It is important that boards and managers understand how this priority amount is calculated and established.

When a unit owner's common expenses are more than sixty days past due, a lien automatically arises on the unit for all the amounts due pursuant to M.G.L. c. 183A, § 6. This occurs without any action on behalf of the organization of unit owners. While the lien itself arises automatically, the "super priority" portion is not automatically established. An organization of unit owners is only granted priority status after it files a lawsuit against the unit owner.  

The super priority is secured only for common expenses for the six months preceding the commencement of the lawsuit and reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred in enforcing the lien. All other fees, including monthly assessments outside the six-month window, late charges, fines, and interest, do not receive priority status over first mortgages.

Timing is critically important because the organization of unit owners cannot immediately file suit against a delinquent owner. Notice must first be sent to both the unit owner and the first-lien mortgagee. Only after these notices are sent can the organization of unit owners perfect the full scope of its super priority lien by filing its lawsuit. Because the notice includes a response time, the organization of unit owners can lose priority if it delays too long; it cannot simply send out notice and file suit the same day if it intends to perfect and preserve the super priority.

The six-month priority can be established for successive periods by filing another complaint. A condominium must restart the whole process, including sending the applicable notices. For example, if the organization of unit owners established its priority by filing a complaint in January, and as expected, the dues continue to go unpaid for the following six months, then the organization of unit owners may file suit again to establish priority for that six-month period of common expense assessments. The January lawsuit only establishes priority retroactively, it does not create a priority for amounts unpaid in the months that follow the filing of the complaint. These “rolling liens” may continue indefinitely for successive six-month periods if necessary.

Accordingly, the boards or managers should send overdue account ledgers to legal counsel as soon as the sixty-day threshold is reached. Boards are sometimes tempted to give owners extra time to repay past due balances in reliance on assurances that payment will be submitted on a later date or in response to other stated reasons for failure to timely pay. However, in reaching any agreement with a unit owner care must be taken because an organization of unit owners risks losing priority status by delaying.  Moreover, the sooner notice is sent to first mortgagees, the sooner they will pay the priority amounts and legal fees – especially where they can avoid increasing legal costs by forcing the organization of unit owners to file suit.  

Some boards also mistakenly assume that there is no mortgage simply because the same unit owner was previously involved in a lien enforcement action and did not have a mortgage at that time. Unit owners may acquire mortgages at any time, including between lien enforcement actions, and the only way to be certain no mortgage exists is through a title search.  A board can only make an informed decision where it has all the relevant information.

Massachusetts law provides condominium associations with powerful collection tools, but only if boards use them properly and promptly. The super priority under M.G.L. c. 183A, § 6 requires timely action and the involvement of legal counsel. If properly and timely leveraged, an organization of unit owners should be able to recover all   unpaid common expense assessments; however, delays risk priority status. Boards should establish clear policies for sending delinquent accounts to legal counsel at the sixty-day mark, even for accounts already involved in ongoing litigation.

An associate in the Quincy-based firm of Moriarty, Bielan & Gamache LLC, Chris O'Connor possesses a strong foundation in condominium association law and experience handling complex litigation in construction, real estate, and business matters. Chris can be contacted at coconnor@mbgllc.com.

Discretionary Decisions of a Condominium Board Do Not Receive Absolute Protection Under the Reasonableness Standard or the Business Judgement Rule

David M. Rogers

Discretionary decisions of a condominium board are often afforded protection under either a reasonableness standard or the business judgment rule.  In brief,


a board’s decisions will be preserved if they were made in good faith and for the benefit of the association.  However, these protections are not absolute and, as evidenced by a recent decision from the Land Court, arbitrary, inconsistent, and unsupported decisions will not be upheld when subjected to a judge’s scrutiny.

In a February decision, the Land Court found that where a condominium board denied a unit owner’s request for permission to wall up an exterior entrance to her unit at her expense, the board failed to act in good faith and in the exercise of its honest judgment in the lawful and legitimate furtherance of the condominium’s purposes.  Feldman v. Sanctuary Condominium Association (Land Court; 24 MISC 000298).  Judge Vhay found that no legal standard supported the condominium board’s denial of the unit owner’s request and, as such, the board’s decision could not be upheld.

Constructed in 1988, the Sanctuary Condominium is a community located in Salem and consists of 172 attached townhomes.  Debra Feldman purchased a unit while the project was being constructed.  During construction, she noted that the unit she was purchasing – unlike the other homes within the community – had an exterior entrance located at the corner of the home’s kitchen.  Ms. Feldman asked the developer’s principal, Howard Farfard, to remove and close the kitchen exit.  Mr. Farfard, who was also one of the initial board members at the condominium, told Ms. Feldman that he would not close the exit, but that she could seek the board’s permission to close the opening, at her expense, and that the board would approve such a request.

Ms. Feldman closed on the purchase of her unit in May of 1987.  Thereafter, she tried several times to obtain the board’s permission to wall up the kitchen entrance.  Indeed, her first request for the board’s approval of the entrance closing came within a year of buying her unit.  This request, as well as several others, were rejected by the board.  Finally, in May of 2024, Ms. Feldman – representing herself as a pro se plaintiff – sued the association over the issue.  The matter was tried before the Land Court over two days in late 2025.  The case involved a determination of whether the Board acted improperly under Section 9(b) of the condominium’s master deed, which provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

Use of the Units.  Unless permitted otherwise by instrument in writing duly executed in accordance with the By-Laws of the [Sanctuary Condominium] Trust [the “Trust”]:

 

 

(b)   The architectural and structural integrity of the Buildings and Units shall be preserved without modification, and to that end, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, no awning , screen, antenna, sign, banner or other device, and no exterior or structural change, addition, projection, decoration or other feature shall be erected or placed upon or attached to any such Unit or any part thereof; no addition to or change or replacement (except, so far as practicable, with identical kind) of any exterior light, door knocker or other exterior hardware, exterior door, or door frames shall be made, and no painting, attaching of decalcomania or other decoration shall be done on any exterior part or surface of any Unit nor on the interior surface of any window…

Over the years, Ms. Feldman’s kitchen door proved problematic.  Following the board’s first denial to wall up the entrance, a wintertime nor’easter caused water to blow into her home through the bottom of the kitchen door.  The frame of the kitchen door rotted or experienced rot four times.  Around 2000, the board hired someone to remove the rot and repair the frame.  The third time the frame rotted – sometime before 2020 – the board replaced the door and frame.  Unfortunately, this did not prevent water from entering the kitchen during subsequent nor’easters or when contractors power-washed the home’s exterior.  At the time of trial, the frame was showing mold and rot again.

Although most of the buildings within the condominium community were similar to the one that contained Ms. Feldman’s unit, many of the buildings have units with exteriors that differ in many ways from that of other buildings.  Many of those exterior changes occurred following the original construction.  Most of these changes, which were not uniform, received the board’s approval.  The board otherwise tolerated the changes that did not receive approval.

In 2022, Ms. Feldman – in response to the requirements of the board – provided it with photos of the affected area, a quote from a licensed and insured contractor, and assurances that the work would be done at her expense.  Nonetheless, the board again rejected her request – claiming that the board “cannot allow owners to make structural changes to the buildings that will fall back onto the Association to maintain.”  Ms. Feldman thereafter initiated a lawsuit against the association.

Judge Vhay found that the walling of the unit’s kitchen exit would not result in additional maintenance costs.  Indeed, it was costing the association money to address the door’s rot on multiple occasions.  Those costs would disappear.  Having the door removed would not increase the association’s power-washing or painting expenses (the association used to paint and power-wash the door).  Also, no evidence at trial supported the board’s contention that the work proposed by Ms. Feldman would raise any structural concerns whatsoever.  The subject work involved simple carpentry.

Discretionary decisions of a condominium board are subjected to scrutiny under one of two standards of review: (1) the business judgment rule, or (2) the reasonableness standard.

Under the business judgment rule, the board and its individual members are not liable for actions taken in good faith and in the exercise of honest judgment in the lawful and legitimate furtherance of the interests of the unit owners.  Levandusky v. One Fifth Ave. Apartment Corp., 553 N.E.2d 1317, 1321-23 (N.Y. 1990).  The standard has its origins in claims against board members in their individual capacities but has been applied in the Commonwealth to claims against the board.  E.g., Pompei v. Fincham, No. 07-4743-BLS2, 2007 WL 4626915, at *2 (Mass. Super. Ct. Nov. 16, 2007) (Fabricant, J.); Pederzani v. Guerriere, No. 930502A, 1995 WL 1146832, at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct. Aug. 11, 1995) (Hely, J.).  There are also trial court cases refusing to apply the business judgment rule in this circumstance. E.g., Trs. of Muzzey High Condo. Trust v. Lexington, 15 Mass. L. Rptr. 91, 2002 WL 1799736, at *12 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 7, 2002) (Neel, J.).  An application of the business judgment rule creates a much higher burden on a complaining party and typically gives the board the necessary discretion to make what are often difficult decisions capable of resolution in numerous different ways.

In the alternative, an application of a reasonableness standard, which also gives deference to the board’s decision, may be applied by the court.  The desired review is akin to the review of a municipal zoning board.  The board has broad discretion in its decision making, but the discretion is not unlimited.  The trial court should not substitute its judgment for the judgment of the board; so long as the board’s exercise of discretion was reasonable, it is sustainable even if a unit owner or reviewing court may have decided otherwise.  Association counsel will find substantial support for this standard of review in appellate decisions of other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Bolandz v. 1230-1250 Twenty-Third St. Condo. Unit Owners Ass’n, Inc., 849 A.2d 1010, 1014-15 (D.C. 2004).

Judge Vhay determined that – regardless of the standard applied – the court could not uphold the board’s decision to deny Ms. Feldman permission to perform the subject work to her kitchen door, writing as follows:

The Court needn’t decide which standard controls board decisions pertaining exclusively to condominium common areas.  That’s because the Board’s 2022 denial fails every test described above.  The decision’s not reasonable under the facts proven at trial: the Work will cost the association nothing; it will save the Association future maintenance and repair costs; and it will reduce the Association’s liability for future interior damage to 13 Aurora as well as rot and mold infestation.  But the denial’s also not worthy of deference under the business judgment doctrine.  The denial’s arbitrary: the Board allowed more structurally intrusive alterations to Common Elements at 17 Aurora.  The denial’s not credible: the Board’s August 22 denial letter gives only one (factually unsupported) reason for denial, and by the time of trial, the Board offered four new (likewise unsupported) excuses.  The denial reflects no care in its consideration of the facts, despite the Board’s going through the motions of asking Feldman for construction details.  And the Board ultimately failed at trial to articulate even a single substantiated reason why, for the good of the Association, the Board denied the Work.

After admonishing the board for its failure to act reasonably or to utilize sound business judgment, Judge Vhay entered judgment in Ms. Feldman’s favor and remanded the case to the board with instructions that it allow Ms. Feldman to have her kitchen door removed and walled up.  

The Sanctuary Condominium case serves as a reminder that condominium boards cannot rule with impunity.  While boards are afforded substantial discretion, that discretion is not limitless.  As Judge Vhay determined, the decisions of a board must be in good faith and in the exercise of its honest judgment in the lawful and legitimate furtherance of the condominium’s purposes.  A board’s decision should be based on sound reasoning and its decisions over time should be consistent.  When faced with requests from a challenging unit owner, a board should consult with counsel in order to help assist with reaching well-reasoned decisions.  It is far better practice to try to address these issues as they initially arise, rather than waiting to be sued by a pro se unit owner.

Dave is a principal in the firm of Moriarty, Bielan & Gamache LLC, headquartered in Quincy. He specializes in complex civil litigation at both the trial, and appellate levels. Dave’s practice is focused on construction, real estate, and condominium matters. His clients include condominium associations, real estate developers, general contractors, subcontractors, and individuals.  Dave can be contacted at drogers@mbgllc.com.


Wednesday, April 15, 2026

So, You Think You Can get a Massachusetts Document Notarized in California?

 Lisa J. Delany 

It should be easy having a Massachusetts document notarized in California; draft the document using the acknowledgment or jurat clause provided in M.G.L. c. 222, §§ 15(c) or 15(d) or the Appendix to c. 183, send to California with instructions to insert the type of government issued ID used to verify identity, instruct the notary affixes a raised seal or legible notary stamp, and request a call if there are any questions.

But why did the notary cross out the acknowledgment clause and append a California Notary Acknowledgment page with other language and without calling?

Massachusetts and California notary laws are very different.  The California notary and acknowledgment laws are in Civil Code § 1189 (2025) and the laws on jurat are in Government Code § 8202 (2025).

Its acknowledgment statute is specific and limits the notary’s role to identity verification only.  Section 1189(a)(1) requires:

Any certificate of acknowledgment taken within this state shall include a notice at the top of the certificate of acknowledgment in an enclosed box stating:  “A notary public or other officer completing this certificate verifies only the identity of the individual who signed the document to which this certificate is attached, and not the truthfulness, accuracy or validity of that document.”  This notice shall be legible.

California’s jurat law is similar, and its mandatory disclaimer in § 8202(b) requires:

A notary public or other officer completing this certificate verifies only the identity of the individual who signed the document to which this certificate is attached, and not the truthfulness, accuracy, or validity of that document.

California’s § 1189(a)(4) also imposes up to a $10,000 penalty if a notary makes a known false material statement. 

Therefore, many California notaries deem their laws must take precedence and they cannot inquire whether the document execution was voluntary or for the stated purpose nor should they certify the veracity of such material facts or accept a document certifying the contents are truthful and accurate. 

The first possible solution can be found in California’s § 1189(b) that allows using another state’s acknowledgment clause for documents to be filed in that state.  But California notaries may still refuse to use the Massachusetts acknowledgment clause, especially for documents signed representationally (trustee, corporate officer, etc.), as § 1189(b) concludes:

. . . provided the form does not require the notary to determine or certify that the signer holds a particular representative capacity or to make other determinations and certifications not allowed by California law. 

It appears the two states are in conflict as Massachusetts requires either an individual or representational acknowledgment of a voluntary act for the stated purpose or a jurat that the document is to the best of knowledge and belief, yet the California Codes prohibit the notary from making such statements.

Is there another solution?

There is actually a difference in the Massachusetts and California statutes.

Massachusetts requires the signatory, and not the notary, acknowledges that they signed the document voluntarily for its stated purpose or certifies that the contents of the document are truthful or accurate to the best of the signatory’s knowledge and belief.  Only the signatory is the required actor, not the notary, and therefore the two states are complementary and do not conflict as the Massachusetts clauses do not request any prohibited actions from California notaries.

California notaries may still balk as the Massachusetts statutes require the notary inquires whether the signatory acknowledges their voluntary action or whether the document is to the best of the signatory’s knowledge and belief and this mere inquiry could be viewed by a California notary as a prohibited action and tantamount to their making their own material certification of the signatory’s actions.

The real solution is in a single word in M.G.L. c. 222, § 15(b), which provides:

A notary public shall take the acknowledgment of the signatory or mark of persons acknowledging for themselves, or in any representational capacity by using substantially the following form . . .

Similarly, M.G.L. c. 183, § 42 provides the notary forms in the Appendix to c. 183 may be used, but “. . . those forms shall not preclude the use of any other forms lawfully used . . .”

Therefore, the suggested Massachusetts notary and jurat clauses can be edited to clarify all actions are by the signatory without the notary making any material statements of fact.  The following acknowledgement edit is suggested:

 “Then personally appeared . . . who acknowledged stated to me that the document was signed voluntarily for its stated purpose . . .” 

Or the following jurat clause edit is suggested:

“. . . and who stated, swore or affirmed to me . . .” 

Massachusetts notaries are accustomed to inquiring about the signatory’s actions, whereas California notaries may believe merely asking the intention is proscribed under their laws.  Instead, the one word change to “stated” allows the signatory to essentially say “Hi, I’m Bob. I’m the (trustee/president/etc.) of ABC, and I meant to sign this document.”  The California notary is not then making their own representations or certifications, rather they simply heard the signatory’s offered statement of intentions. 

M.G.L. c. 222, § 15(h) also provides direction to the Land Court Guidelines for documents to be filed in registered land.  The Land Court is aware of the apparent conflict between Massachusetts and California notary statutes and is available for document inquiries.

Co-chair of REBA’s Title Insurance & National Affairs Section, Lisa Delaney owns the Braintree firm Carvin & Delaney, LLC. Her practice centers on large commercial transactions where she handles complex title research and provides methodically written, detailed analysis of clear and concise facts.  She can be contacted at ldelaney@carvindelaney.com

Land Court’s New Process Expedites Deregistration

 Gregory Bradford and Alexander Eddinger

Commercial real estate transactions often involve a mix of diligence items that create complications for all parties involved. Environmental and permitting challenges are often top of mind. The more arcane realm of title also poses unique risks. While it is widely


understood that a property needs to have “clear title” or “marketable title,” some real estate professionals assume that merely getting a deed and a title insurance policy is sufficient for diligence purposes. The reality, however, is that a title insurance policy itself cannot extinguish all encumbrances or registry requirements that affect a property. Title issues will always pose the risk of significantly extending the amount of time required to acquire or finance a property, and in certain cases add burdens to the process of subdividing the land or converting the land into a condominium.

In all of these situations, an attorney or project manager should prioritize determining whether the land is so-called “registered land” subject to the title requirements of the Land Court. Registered land is so-called Torrens system of title – in other words, a method where the government maintains a registry for each parcel and issues a certificate of title that acts as conclusive proof of ownership. This, in turn, means that the registry clerks and Land Court staff scrutinize all documents and plans submitted for recording, with increased likelihood of delays or rejections with additional complications.

When creating a condominium with the Land Court, the bulk of the condominium documents must be presented to the court for approval before they can be recorded. Furthermore, each unit must be separately registered after a review with the court staff. Similarly, many development projects require the land to be subdivided into new parcels, and sometimes a developer will try to file a subdivision plan as a strategic move to “freeze” the current zoning designation under M.G.L. c. 40A, § 6. In each case, timing and deadlines matter immensely. When subdividing registered land, the draft plan must go through a review process with court staff and satisfy certain specific engineering and survey requirements that are not otherwise imposed on subdivision plans.

All of this begs the question – why not simply “de-register” the land?

Until recently, the answer to the question above was simple: it still took a long time for the Land Court to approve petitions to withdraw the land from the registered land system. And not all properties satisfied the specific criteria required to qualify for withdrawal.

Fortunately, the Massachusetts Legislature enacted The Massachusetts Affordable Homes Act (H. 4977) in 2024, which revised G.L. c. 185, § 52 to allow registered land to be voluntarily deregistered for any reason and set an expedited timeline for the Land Court to approve deregistration complaints. These changes have now been implemented and the revised process is detailed in new guidance from the Land Court’s Chief Title Examiner


Filing and Serving the Complaint

To begin the deregistration process, a Complaint for Voluntary Withdrawal and a Notice of Voluntary Withdrawal must each be filed with the Land Court.  The Complaint must list all current owners of the property and identify any mortgagees, lessees, or option holders of record (collectively, “Interest Holders”), including any Interest Holders listed on the property’s certificate of title and memoranda of encumbrances. It is recommended that the petitioner obtain and file signed assents of any Interest Holders with the Complaint. Filing such assents with the Complaint will eliminate the need to serve the Interest Holders, as further detailed below. The Complaint must also include an attested copy of the property’s certificate of title.

If the property owner is a corporate entity or trust, certain additional materials must also be filed with the Complaint. For corporate entities, a current (issued within the last 60 days) Massachusetts Certificate of Good Standing is required, and trusts must file a Trustee’s Certificate pursuant to G.L. c. 184, § 35. In either case, the Complaint must also be signed by a Massachusetts lawyer.

The Notice[1] must be signed and acknowledged by all fee owners of the property to be withdrawn, with certain basic title and owner information plugged into the form where indicated.

Once the Complaint and Notice have been filed with the court, (i) a Notification of Complaint for Voluntary Withdrawal and (ii) Land Court file-stamped copy of the Complaint and Notice must then serve by certified mail on all Interest Holders who have not assented to the Complaint. If assents of all Interest Holders were obtained and filed with the Complaint, this service requirement is eliminated. After serving any Interest Holders, an Affidavit of Service must be filed with the court certifying that any non-assenting Interest Holders have been served and providing proof of service. If the property owner is represented by a lawyer, that lawyer must sign the Affidavit.


Land Court Review and Deregistration

The new rules provide that within 30 days of receiving all required information and documentation, and if no objections to the deregistration have been filed, the court will move ahead and endorse the Notice of Voluntary Withdrawal. Once the Notice has been endorsed, the owner must file the Notice with the applicable registry district. This is the final step for the owner to take (though the registry district will then go through a ministerial process to verify the deregistration to officially withdraw the property).

Although many practitioners were initially skeptical of the court’s ability to process petitions within the 30-day window, we are generally finding that the court staff has been able to approve petitions within 30-60 days, depending on the relative complexity of the title. Much of the timing pressure remains on the front-end, when the owner and their counsel work on preparing the petition and obtaining assents from lenders and tenants.

Gregory Bradford is a partner in the Real Estate Department of Nutter McClennan & Fish LLP, and a member of the Commercial and Real Estate Finance practice group and the Development, Land Use and Permitting practice group. His practice focuses on commercial transactions, and he also advises clients on various aspects of complex development projects. He can be contacted at ebradford@nutter.com. 

Alex Eddinger is an associate in Nutter’s Real Estate Department. He advises clients on a broad array of real estate issues, including acquisitions and dispositions, real estate financing, zoning, and land use matters. His real estate litigation practice currently focuses on representing clients in zoning appeals, easement and title disputes, and related land use litigation. Prior to joining Nutter, he served as a judicial law clerk to the Hon. Jennifer S.D. Roberts of the Land Court.  Alex can be contacted at aeddinger@nutter.com.

 

 

 



 

 

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