By
Caitlin E. Loftus
Massachusetts courts have long applied a
bright-line rule, established in 1965 in Murphy v. Mart Realty of Brockton,
Inc., that prohibits the use of an easement to benefit land to which that
easement is not appurtenant. The Supreme
Judicial Court recently examined a challenge to this rule in Taylor v. Martha’s
Vineyard Land Bank Comm’n, 475 Mass. 672, a dispute over the scope of
easements benefitting several parcels owned by the Land Bank in Aquinnah.
The Land Bank advocated replacing the
rule with a fact-intensive inquiry weighing whether the use of a particular
easement to access non-appurtenant parcels unfairly increases the burden on
that easement. After granting direct appellate review and soliciting amicus briefs,
the Supreme Judicial Court reaffirmed the rule set forth in Murphy in a
concise and unanimous decision.
The Land Bank owns and manages a nature
preserve on the Gay Head Cliffs of Martha’s Vineyard. At issue in Taylor
were four parcels in the preserve benefitting from two separate easements over
property owned by the plaintiffs Hugh and Jeanne Taylor. The easements provide
access to and from Lighthouse Road, the nearest public way. Neither easement is appurtenant to all four
parcels. The first easement, referred to as the Disputed Way, is appurtenant to
the three southernmost parcels. The second easement, referred to as the
Twenty-Foot Way, is appurtenant to the northernmost parcel, so-called Diem Lot
5. A separate parcel, owned by the Taylors and on which they operate the
Outermost Inn, connects the southernmost parcel to Lighthouse Road.
In May, 2010, the Land Bank received
approval for a plan to create a hiking trail over the four lots. The plan
called for both easements to be incorporated into a single loop trail. The
proposed loop, beginning at Lighthouse Road, would run the full length of the
Disputed Way over the Taylors’ property and then continue over the three
southernmost parcels. The trail would then run over Diem Lot 5 and intersect
with the Twenty-Foot Way, running along the Twenty-Foot Way until returning to
the trail’s point of origin at Lighthouse Road.
Land Court Decision
In June, 2010, the Taylors filed a complaint
seeking a declaratory judgment that the Land Bank could not use the Disputed
Way as part of the proposed hiking trail. Because the Disputed Way was
appurtenant only to three parcels, the Taylors argued the Land Bank could not
use it to reach the fourth parcel, Diem Lot 5, and that such use constituted
overloading. Plaintiffs also argued that opening the Disputed Way to the public,
even without using it to reach Diem Lot 5, constituted overburdening.
Overloading refers to the use of an easement to serve land other than that to
which it is appurtenant, while overburdening describes the use of an easement
for purposes different from those intended when it was created.
Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment in
March, 2011, which was allowed in part. The Land Court judge ruled that
incorporating the Disputed Way into a hiking loop that reached Diem Lot 5 would
overload the easement and, accordingly, any trail over the Disputed Way must
end before connecting to Diem Lot 5. This effectively divided the proposed loop
into two separate trails that would prevent hikers from completing a single
connected loop. The judge denied summary judgment on the overburdening issue,
finding there was a genuine issue of material fact whether opening the Disputed
Way to the public would unreasonably increase pedestrian traffic. After
conducting a trial on the overburdening issue, he concluded that such public use
fell within the easement’s original scope and did not constitute overburdening.
Final judgment issued, incorporating the summary judgment decision.
The Land Bank appealed and applied for
direct appellate review. Its notice of appeal challenged only the summary
judgment ruling that the Disputed Way could not be used to benefit Diem Lot 5.
Direct appellate review was allowed.
SJC Decision
Under Murphy, “a right of way
appurtenant to the land conveyed cannot be used by the owner of the dominant tenement
to pass to or from other land adjacent to or beyond that to which the easement
is appurtenant.”
Both parties agreed that under this rule, the Land Bank is
prohibited from using the Disputed Way to access a parcel the easement was not
intended to benefit, in this case, Diem Lot 5. The Land Bank, however, urged
the SJC to adopt a new rule replacing the bright-line Murphy rule. It
proposed a fact-based inquiry to determine whether use of an easement to
benefit non-appurtenant land would place additional burdens on a servient
estate and, if yes, whether the additional burdens would constitute an unfair
extension beyond the easement’s original scope. Under the proposed rule, the
Land Bank argued use of the Disputed Way to reach Diem Lot 5 would not constitute
overloading, as pedestrian traffic over the Taylors’ property was unlikely to
increase merely because the Disputed Way could now be used to access a fourth
lot.
While the SJC acknowledged the proposed
rule provided more flexibility, it ultimately was not persuaded that the
benefits of flexibility outweighed its costs. The SJC explained a new rule could
inject uncertainty in land ownership, where individuals often base their
actions and decisions on existing precedent, and further stated it could potentially
extend the litigation process, hurting owners of small servient parcels lacking
the financial means to challenge defendants seeking to acquire and develop
multiple parcels of land. The proposed fact-intensive inquiry also presented difficult
factual disputes, such as defining an easement’s purpose or determining whether
an expansion of the easement’s use would cause unreasonable damage or
interference. The SJC expressly hoped to avoid these situations with the
formulation of the Murphy rule.
The SJC noted that maintaining the Murphy
rule comported with the principle that the terms and conditions of an easement
are well within the control of the parties creating it. The SJC distinguished the
out-of-state cases cited by the Land Bank in support of a more fact-based
analysis as situations in which the parties, at the time they created the
easements, intended or contemplated that they could benefit after-acquired or
non-appurtenant lots. Here, however, the Disputed Way was not intended to
benefit Diem Lot 5 at the time of its creation.
The SJC rejected the Land Bank’s
assertions that the Murphy rule creates “substantial impracticalit[ies]”
for landowners in similar situations and is inconsistent with the public policy
favoring “socially productive” uses of land. The application of the bright-line
rule in Taylor will not prevent hikers from making use of both the
Disputed Way and the Twenty-Foot Way. It only prevents them from walking the
two trails in a single connected loop. This disconnect may be inconvenient, but
the SJC did not view it as a “substantial impracticality.”
After taking this case for direct
appellate review, some may have wondered whether the bright-line rule
articulated in Murphy was marked for replacement or modification. The
SJC stated that, while it may deviate from precedent, it chooses to do so only
when the benefits of the change outweigh those provided by stare decisis. In upholding the
Murphy rule, and declining to add or create exceptions, the SJC found
that the certainty provided by a bright-line rule defining a property owner’s
rights outweighed any perceived advantages of a more flexible standard.
Caitlin
Loftus is a research attorney at the Land Court Department of the Trial
Court. Prior to that she served as law
clerk to Associate Justice Karyn F. Scheier.
